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ALIBABA, AMAZON, AND 
COUNTERFEITING IN THE AGE OF 
THE INTERNET 
Daniel C.K. Chow 
Abstract: 
The advent of e-commerce marketplaces such as Alibaba and Amazon in the new 
millennium has led to the proliferation of the sale of counterfeit goods around the 
world through the Internet. Brand owners find that Internet counterfeiters 
operating in the digital world present even more challenges than those using only 
brick-and-mortar operations. Internet counterfeiters have unprecedented access 
to consumers. They use false identities and addresses and vanish into cyberspace 
at the first sign of trouble. Brand owners seeking help from Alibaba and Amazon 
to remove listings of counterfeits have become frustrated by their convoluted and 
labyrinthine notice and take-down procedures. Even when these procedures are 
used successfully, brand owners find that the process can take months only to 
have the counterfeiter reappear in short order using a new false identity. Many 
brand owners find that dealing with Alibaba and Amazon only adds to their 
misery and believe that both tolerate counterfeits as they earn revenue from all 
sales, including sales of counterfeit goods. 
This Article sets forth for the first time how brand owners can use a set of 
currently available information technology tools to help create an effective 
deterrent to counterfeits on the Internet. Using these tools, brand owners can 
force counterfeiters to abandon the subterfuge and disguise that they rely on so 
that brand owners can—without the assistance of e-commerce platforms—
directly pursue counterfeiters in civil and criminal actions in China where most 
of the counterfeiters are located and in the United States. The proposed approach 
should help deter counterfeiters who always work in secrecy and disguise by 
                                                          
 B.A., JD, Yale University. Bazler Chair in Business Law, The Ohio State University Michael 
E. Moritz College of Law. The author lived and worked in China as head of the legal 
department for a multinational company in the consumer products business with serious 
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secretary for the China Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, a lobby group for multinationals in 
China (now known as the Quality Brands Protection Committee), and was the principal author 
of the white paper on counterfeiting in China commissioned by the PRC State Council. More 
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exposing them to what they fear and loathe the most: transparency and 
accountability for their illegal actions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of internet commerce (e-commerce) in the early 2000s 
coincided with the unprecedented and historic rise of counterfeiting in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) that had begun in the 1990s.1 
Although sales of counterfeits through brick-and-mortar establishments had 
already gained a substantial share of the market in China by the early 2000s,2 
the rise of the Internet in the new millennium has allowed counterfeiters in 
China unparalleled access to consumers not just in China but also in the 
United States and worldwide by transcending the physical limitations 
inherent in the use of brick-and-mortar operations.3 Recent studies show that 
counterfeits and infringing products have proliferated on the Internet and 
have reached levels of saturation that were unattainable by counterfeiters 
selling through brick-and-mortar distributors.4 For example, Xinhua, China’s 
official news agency stated that more than 40% of all goods sold online 
through Chinese e-commerce platforms in a recent year were “counterfeits 
or of bad quality.”5 Since Xinhua is controlled by the Communist Party of 
China (the Party) and would want to present China in the best light possible, 
the 40% figure might understate the severity of the problem. Most consumers 
in China believe that the likelihood of a product sold on the Internet is 
counterfeit is very high, and those who wish to buy genuine products avoid 
the use of the Internet altogether.6 This 40% figure cited by Xinhua is double 
the estimated 15-20% rate of counterfeits sold in brick-and-mortar 
establishments in China.7 In the United States, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office recently conducted a study and found that among a selection of 47 
items belonging to four types of frequently counterfeited goods (i.e., 
sneakers, mugs, cosmetics, and phone chargers) purchased online, 27 were 
                                                          
 1 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. 
U.L Q. 1, 3 (2000). 
 2 By the early 2000s, brand owners estimated that counterfeits comprised 15-20% of all 
goods sold on the market in China. See id. at 3 n.3 (citing Joseph T. Simone, Countering 
Counterfeiters, CHINA BUS. REV., Jan. 1, 1999, at 12). 
 3 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-216, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE EFFORTS TO ADDRESS RISKS POSED BY CHANGING COUNTERFEITS 
MARKET 11 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/689713.pdf (discussing how the use of 
the internet allows counterfeiters to transcend limits of brick and mortar counterfeiting) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 4 See infra Parts II.A & II.B. 
 5 More than 40 Per Cent of China’s Online Sales ‘Counterfeits or Bad Quality’, 
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11971 
401/More-than-40-per-cent-of-Chinas-online-sales-counterfeit-or-bad-quality.html. Xinhua 
does not distinguish between counterfeits and products of poor quality; it is unclear whether 
Xinhua believes that these are two separate categories of goods or a single category as most 
counterfeits are of poor quality. 
 6 This observation is based upon the author’s own experience living and working in 
China and on discussions with colleagues and associates. 
 7 See Chow, supra note 1, at 3 n.3. 
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authentic and 20 were counterfeit.8 After Seattle-based Amazon made efforts 
in 2015 to woo Chinese manufacturers to sell directly on its platform, 
complaints about counterfeits and infringing products sold on Amazon have 
risen sharply.9 
Efforts by multinational companies (MNCs) that own trademarks (or 
brands), copyrights, and other intellectual property rights to stem the flow of 
counterfeits through the Internet have been largely unsuccessful, leading to 
anger and frustration.10 Under current legal regimes, e-commerce platforms 
are in general not liable for counterfeits sold by third-party online vendors 
using the site;11 liability lies with the vendor itself, but many brand owners 
argue that Internet commerce sites facilitate the sales of counterfeits.12 E-
commerce platforms earn revenues from sales, including sales of 
counterfeits.13 Many brand owners argue that e-commerce platforms 
facilitate counterfeiting by allowing webpages or postings of counterfeit 
goods to remain on their sites despite the many protests of brand owners.14 
Some of these offending webpages are removed after brand owners suffer 
through a long and convoluted notice and takedown procedure only to 
reappear under a new false name and address in short order.15 In China, 
                                                          
 8 See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. The products were Nike Air Jordan shoes, Yeti 
travel mugs, Urban Decay cosmetics, and UL-certified phone chargers. Id. 
 9 Wade Shepard, How Amazon’s Wooing of Chinese Sellers Is Killing Small American 
Businesses, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/02 
/14/how-amazons-wooing-of-chinese-sellers-is-hurting-american-innovation/#13af78741d 
f2. 
 10 See infra Parts II.B & II.D. 
 11 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 116-68) (creating a “safe harbor” from vicarious liability for ISPs that 
upon notification remove infringing material expeditiously). For cases holding that the ISP is 
not vicariously liable for the sale by third party vendors, see generally Milo & Gabby, LLC v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 2015 WL 4394673 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2015); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 2009 WL 1334364 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2009); Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 12 See infra Parts II.B, II.D & II.E. 
 13 See David Pierson, Extra Inventory. More Sales. Lower Prices. How Counterfeits 
Benefit Amazon, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/ 
technology/la-fi-tn-amazon-counterfeits-20180928-story.html (“Not only has [Amazon] 
avoided any serious backlash for allowing the sale of fake goods, it’s actually thrived from it, 
say more than two dozen brand owners, e-commerce consultants, attorneys, investigators and 
public policy experts.”). 
 14 See infra Parts II.D & II.E. 
 15 See Pierson, supra note 13 (“[I]f Amazon shutters one store for selling knockoffs, the 
owner often shifts operations to another.”); Alana Semuels, Amazon May Have a Counterfeit 
Problem, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2018/04/amazon-may-have-a-counterfeit-problem/558482/ (“‘These problems come up once 
a week.’”). Cf. Jeff Bercovici, Huge Counterfeiting Problem. This “Shark Tank” Company Is 
Fighting Back, INC.COM (Apr. 2019), https://www.inc.com/magazine/201904/jeff-bercovici 
/amazon-fake-copycat-knockoff-products-small-business.html (“A recent Pointer report 
noted that Amazon in among the least responsive of all e-commerce platforms to takedown 
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MNCs have waged a decades-long struggle against Alibaba to stem the sale 
of counterfeits with few tangible results.16 Although Alibaba claims to have 
made many serious efforts in combatting the sale of counterfeit goods, many 
brand owners remain frustrated and dissatisfied.17 As in the case of Alibaba, 
brand owners in the United States are frustrated with what they perceive to 
be Amazon’s half-hearted efforts to battle the flow of counterfeits.18 This 
Article examines counterfeiting on the Internet with a focus on Alibaba and 
Amazon, the largest e-commerce platforms in China and the United States 
respectively and in the world.19 The lessons learned can be immediately 
applied to other e-commerce platforms.  
This Article focuses on why the sale of counterfeits on the Internet has 
exploded and allowed counterfeiters to penetrate markets that were 
previously unavailable when counterfeiters were limited to brick and mortar 
operations. Not only has the Internet given counterfeiters vast new 
opportunities for profit but it has also allowed them to operate in the digital 
world in the open, while simultaneously being able to use false cyber 
identities and addresses to evade detection and capture by brand owners and 
law enforcement authorities.20 With the emergence of the Internet, 
counterfeiting and piracy—already a worldwide problem—have entered into 
a new and even more potent phase.21 Up to the present, MNCs have been 
frustrated by their inability to curtail the growth of counterfeits on the 
Internet.22 
Although the problems created by the Internet are daunting, this Article 
argues that a simple and effective deterrent exists in China but has been 
overlooked or ignored by MNCs and e-commerce platforms and explains 
how this deterrent can be used effectively. This Article sets forth for the first 
time how these remedial measures can be used to curtail the explosion of 
                                                          
notices, removing only 25 percent of infringing listings.”). 
 16 See infra Part II.D. 
 17 See id. 
 18 According to one brand owner representative, “Amazon is making money hand over 
fist from counterfeiters, and they’ve done about as little as possible for as long as possible to 
address the issue.” Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse, CNBC 
(July 8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-counterfeit-problem-is-
getting-worse.html. See also Semuels, supra note 15 (describing Amazon’s low level of 
responsiveness to brand owner concerns). 
 19 Alibaba is the world’s largest e-commerce marketplace and Amazon is the second 
largest. See infra notes 103 & 107. 
 20 See Pierson, supra note 13. 
 21 See BUS. ACTION TO STOP COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY & INT’L CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERMEDIARIES: FIGHTING COUNTERFEITING 
AND PIRACY IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 5 (2015), https://iccwbo.org/publication/roles-respon 
sibilities-intermediaries/ (“The Internet has been particularly vulnerable . . . to counterfeiters 
and other criminal capitalizing on the success (and intellectual property) of legitimate 
businesses while remaining anonymous and avoiding detection.”). 
 22 See infra Part III. 
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counterfeits on the Internet. In setting forth this analysis, this Article will 
underscore the following three major points that must be understood by all 
MNCs and other brand owners in modern e-commerce.  First, the  
emergence of e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba and Amazon have 
given counterfeiters a vast new tool to reach end use consumers. Prior to the 
Internet, counterfeiters were subject to the physical limitations created by 
brick-and-mortar distribution and retail sites and were unable to penetrate 
distribution channels that would allow them to sell counterfeits in reputable 
retail outlets.23 Consumers had to travel to less desirable locations to buy 
counterfeits as state-owned department stores and high end retailers in China 
and large reputable retail chains such as Walmart, Target, and Costco in the 
United States refused to deal with distributors of counterfeit goods.24 Instead, 
consumers in China or the United States who wished to purchase counterfeits 
had to go to small discount stores, mom-and-pop stores, flea markets, street 
vendors, or private addresses in side streets, back alleys or other undesirable 
locations, a prospect that deterred many consumers.25 The emergence of the 
Internet has now given what counterfeiters have always sought: a legitimate 
distribution channel that consumers can access at any time from their 
computers without having to travel to undesirable locations to buy 
counterfeits from brick-and-mortar sellers.26 The Internet also gives 
counterfeiters the ability to disguise their identities and to disappear into the 
vastness of cyberspace at the first sign of trouble.27 All counterfeiters and 
pirates, whether they sell in brick-and-mortar locations or through the 
Internet, are very fearful of detection and capture.28 Counterfeiters that use 
brick-and-mortar establishments are subject to surprise raids and seizures by 
enforcement authorities,29 but Internet counterfeiters have found ways to use 
false identities that are untraceable by brand owners; even when they are 
detected, Internet pirates that are shut down are able to immediately create 
new false identities and return to their illegal operations on the Internet.30 
Second, PRC enforcement officials have recently acknowledged in an 
                                                          
 23 See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. 
 24 This observation is based on the author’s own experience as an attorney working for 
U.S. brand owners in tracking the distribution channel of counterfeits. 
 25 Id. See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 10 (counterfeits were traditionally sold in 
“underground” or secondary markets such as flea markets or sidewalk vendors). 
 26 See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
 27 See id. 
 28 This observation is based on the author’s firsthand experience in pursuing 
counterfeiters. 
 29 See Chow, supra note 1, at 19 –21 (describing raids conducted in Yiwu City, “a 
significant wholesale distribution center for counterfeit goods in the PRC[,]” from 1998 to 
1999). 
 30 See Pierson, supra note 13 (“[B]rands say the same fraudsters keep showing up under 
different names[.]”); Semuels, supra note 15 (“Milo and Gabby tried to track down the 
[counterfeit] sellers, but almost all of the sellers had given false names when setting up their 
Amazon seller accounts, and the addresses they gave turned out to be bogus as well[.]”). 
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official report that Alibaba sees itself as above the law in China and feels no 
need to follow it.31 MNCs have long suspected that Alibaba tolerates or 
encourages counterfeiting on its sites.32 Brand owners have persistently 
complained that Alibaba and Amazon appear reluctant to assist brand owners 
in tracking down counterfeiters and create unnecessary bureaucratic and 
technical hurdles in the detection of counterfeiters.33 Some brand owners 
have attributed these difficulties to an economic motive: e-commerce 
platforms earn revenue through sales, including sales of counterfeit goods.34 
In the case of Alibaba, brand owners have long suspected that it tolerates or 
supports counterfeiting and these sentiments have been confirmed by official 
statements by PRC enforcement authorities. According to PRC officials, 
Alibaba’s attitude towards the law and enforcement authorities is marked by 
a fundamental “arrogance.”35 In China, it is not unusual for powerful entities 
to view themselves as above the law.36 The Communist Party, the most 
powerful entity of all, sees the law as a mere instrument to be used to serve 
the ends of the Party.37 Alibaba is not intimidated by or fearful of law 
enforcement authorities; to the contrary, Alibaba sees itself as more powerful 
than government law enforcement authorities and answerable only to the 
Party.38 For these reasons, MNCs must accept the reality that Alibaba, in the 
words of PRC officials, tolerates and supports counterfeiters in order to 
protect its revenues from sales of counterfeit goods and that it will likely take 
an intervention by the Party at its highest levels to effect meaningful change 
in Alibaba’s conduct. Any plan to stem the sales of counterfeits on Alibaba’s 
platform that requires Alibaba’s active participation must proceed with the 
assumption that it will be met with resistance or efforts that are half-hearted. 
Third, although the use of the Internet to sell counterfeits presents 
formidable new challenges to brand owners, this Article argues that simple 
and effective measures are available under PRC law to brand owners to deter 
                                                          
 31 See Gongshang Zongju (工商总局), Guanyu Dui Alibaba Jituan Jinxing Xingzheng 
Zhidao Gongzuo Qingkuang de Baipishu (关于对阿里巴巴集团进行行政指导工作情况的
白皮书), translated in STATE ADMIN. OF INDUS. & E-COMMERCE, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, WHITE PAPER ON ALIBABA GROUP HOLDINGS ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE WORK 
SITUATION (2015) [hereinafter SAIC WHITE PAPER]. A partial English translation is available 
at Zheping Huang, The Chinese Government Has Erased a Damning Report on Alibaba, but 
You Can Read It Here, QUARTZ (Jan. 29, 2015), https://qz.com/335675/the-chinese-
government-has-erased-a-damning-report-on-alibaba-but-you-can-read-it-here/. The SAIC 
White Paper is extensively discussed in Part II.B. 
 32 See infra Part II.B. 
 33 See infra Part III.A. 
 34 See e.g., Pierson, supra note 13 (“Not only has [Amazon] avoided any serious backlash 
for allowing the sale of fake goods, it’s actually thrived from it, say more than two dozen 
brand owners, e-commerce consultants, attorneys, investigators and public policy experts.”). 
 35 SAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 31, at 20. 
 36 See infra Part II.D.2.b. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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many counterfeiters from using the Internet and to detect and identify those 
that do.39 This Article proposes and sets forth for the first time a set of simple 
and effective methods that MNCs can use to create effective deterrence to 
counterfeiting on the Internet.40 To the best of the author’s knowledge, no 
MNC, brand owner, or any professional or academic study has previously 
identified these methods, although they are openly available in plain sight in 
China’s legal system, and their use is required and regularly encouraged by 
PRC officials. Although certain aspects of China’s information technology 
industry, such as protection and enforcement of intellectual rights, are weak 
by comparison to the United States, other aspects of China’s information 
technology industry are far ahead of the United States.41 In particular, China’s 
obsessive need to exert pervasive control over and to monitor its citizens and 
all aspects of Chinese society have created the informational technology tools 
available to deter counterfeiters.42 In fact, Chinese government officials have 
urged Internet sites to use the tools available to control entry onto Internet 
sites and to monitor entities on the Internet.43 Brand owners, however, either 
do not trust PRC officials or understand the potential effectiveness of these 
tools. 
Unlike brick-and-mortar counterfeiters who need no permission to 
operate, counterfeiters must obtain a “pass” through a digital port of entry in 
order to obtain access to the Internet to sell their products.44 Operators of e-
commerce platforms have the ability to exercise absolute control over entry. 
Controlling this point of entry through the use of tools created by the PRC 
government is the key to controlling counterfeiting on the Internet. 
Counterfeiters wish to operate in hiding and secrecy; they fear and detest 
transparency and accountability. E-commerce platforms can remove the 
anonymity of the Internet by following a straightforward registration system 
                                                          
 39 See infra Part III. 
 40 Id. 
 41 China is far ahead of the U.S. in the use of technologies, such as facial recognition, to 
closely monitor its citizens. See Zhou Jiaquan, Drones, Facial Recognition, and a Social 
Credit System: 10 Ways China Monitors Its Citizens, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 4, 2018), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2157883/drones-facial-recognition-and-
social-credit-system-10-ways-china. 
 42 China closely monitors its citizens. Recently, China announced a “social credit” system 
in which the activities of each citizen will be ranked, and each citizen given a score evaluating 
the social merit of his or conduct. For a discussion on how China monitors its citizens, see 
Charlie Campbell, How China Is Using “Social Credit Scores” to Rewards and Punish Its 
Citizens, TIME (Jan. 16, 2019), https://time.com/collection/davos-2019/5502592/china-social-
credit-score/. 
 43 See infra Part III. 
 44 Online vendors are required by e-commerce platforms to register before they are 
allowed to access the site. See e.g., Selling on Amazon: Frequently Asked Questions, AMAZON, 
https://services.amazon.com/selling/faq.htm (last visited July 1, 2019) (requiring a business 
name, address, and contact information among other information in order to open an Amazon 
seller account). 
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as required by PRC law.45 However, Alibaba does not faithfully apply the 
requirements of PRC law but instead is careless and loose in verifying entity 
registration.46 Brand owners also complain that Amazon has lax registration 
requirements and registers many entities with fictitious identities and 
addresses.47 
As a condition of gaining access to e-commerce sites, PRC law requires 
all vendors to submit a business license issued by PRC government 
authorities. These licenses have strict disclosure requirements that will reveal 
their true legal identities and locations in strict accordance with the detailed 
and specific information contained in official PRC government records and 
electronically on government websites to the public.48 To obtain this official 
business license, business operators must undergo a review and approval 
process by PRC government authorities over the legality and economic 
feasibility of their proposed business operations.49 Most counterfeiters will 
not wish to submit to such an approval process for fear of being detected and 
being subject to capture and prosecution. Those entities that do undergo this 
official review will then need to openly display their business licenses on the 
website In turn, counterfeiters will be unable to escape detection as brand 
owners will be able to bring suit directly against them.50  
A unique concept of PRC law is that each business entity must have a 
natural person who serves as its legal representative and who is subject to 
civil liability and criminal prosecution.51 The legal representative must be 
identified in the business license so brand owners will have a person in flesh 
and blood against whom they can directly file civil or criminal actions in 
China or in the United States if U.S. contacts exist.52 The faithful execution 
of these requirements should help brand owners to deter many counterfeiters 
from selling through Internet sites. Currently, however, brand owners do not 
insist on enforcement of these requirements and neither Alibaba nor Amazon 
faithfully follows PRC law on entity registration.53 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part II examines the background 
                                                          
 45 See infra Part III. 
 46 See text accompanying notes 231-34 infra. 
 47 See infra note 95. 
 48 See Administrative Measures for Online Trading, art. 23 (promulgated by the State 
Admin. of Indus. & E-Commerce, Order No. 60, Jan. 26, 2014, effective Mar. 15, 2014), 
CLI.4.218557(EN), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=16309&lib=law&EncodingName= 
big5. See also infra Part III. 
 49 See infra Part III. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. III, art. 
57 (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Order No. 66, Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 
2017), translated by Whitmore Gray & Henry Ruiheng Zheng, General Principles of the Civil 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 726 (1986) [hereinafter 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC]. 
 52 See infra Part III. 
 53 Id. 
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of counterfeiting in China and how the advent of the Internet has propelled 
this illegal activity to new heights. The ability to transcend the physical 
limitations created by brick-and-mortar counterfeiting operations has created 
a vast new opportunity in cyberspace for counterfeiters who can now 
compete directly with genuine goods and vanish at the first sign of trouble. 
Part II also discusses brand owner concerns about Alibaba and Amazon. In 
the case of Alibaba, brand owners have long claimed that Alibaba tolerates 
or supports counterfeiting on its websites. A recent in-depth investigation and 
report by PRC national authorities not only confirms this suspicion but also 
sets forth the PRC government’s view that Alibaba sees itself as being above 
the law. Brand owners have also complained that Amazon is unresponsive to 
their concerns about counterfeits, requiring byzantine notice and takedown 
procedures that only add to brand owners’ misery. Part III examines the 
hurdles that brand owners claim that they face in attempting to work with 
Alibaba and Amazon in removing infringing webpages or postings from their 
sites; these frustrations are due to cumbersome notice and takedown 
procedures that can take months and tax brand owners through heavy costs 
in time, energy, and money. Part III then sets forth this Article’s proposed 
method of using existing online tools in the PRC to help create deterrents to 
counterfeiting on the Internet. These tools can be used to combat counterfeits 
on Alibaba and Amazon as well as on other e-commerce platforms. Part IV 
contains concluding observations. 
II. COUNTERFEITING AND THE INTERNET 
A. Brief Overview of Counterfeiting in China 
As early as 2000, China was described as having the most serious 
counterfeiting problem in world history.54 The origin of this problem can be 
traced to 1) China’s access to advanced technology (i.e. intellectual property) 
brought into China by MNCs that make foreign direct investments in China 
and 2) to China’s weak and developing legal system,55 which does not create 
effective deterrence for counterfeiters and infringers of intellectual property 
rights.56 Although U.S. companies have made many efforts through the first 
two decades of the twenty-first century to combat counterfeiting in China, 
China remains the largest source of counterfeits in the world. For example, a 
recent study cited in Forbes indicates that China produces 80% of the world’s 
counterfeits and that counterfeiting is now a $1.7 trillion per year industry.57 
                                                          
 54 Chow, supra note 1, at 3. The background and history of the rise of counterfeiting 
before the advent of the internet is set forth in this article. See infra Parts II.A & II.B. 
 55 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 537–38 (3d. ed. 2015). 
 56 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 643 (3d. 
ed. 2017) (China’s weak legal system does not create effective deterrence.). 
 57 Wade Shepard, Meet the Man Fighting America’s Trade War Against Chinese 
Counterfeits (It’s Not Trump), FORBES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wade 
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The U.S. General Accountability Office reports that in 2016, 88% of all 
seized counterfeit goods by the United States originated from China and 
Hong Kong.58 The European Union claims that China is the largest source of 
counterfeit goods sold into the EU.59 Counterfeiting is now the largest 
criminal enterprise in the world,60 and China is the epicenter of 
counterfeiting.61 The highest number of shipments of counterfeits seized 
around the world originates from East Asia, with China as the top source.62  
On April 3, 2019, the Trump Administration issued a Presidential 
Memorandum announcing that combatting counterfeiting and piracy had 
been elevated to a new level of priority for the United States.63 The 
memorandum specifically tasked the Justice Department and the Department 
of Homeland Security to focus on and investigate “online third party 
marketplaces.”64 This indicates a recognition by the United States that 
counterfeiting on e-commerce platforms is a specialized priority area of 
concern. 
B. The Advent of the Internet 
The rise of Internet sales platforms in the early 2000s created a valuable 
new opportunity for counterfeiters. To understand the significance of this 
development, it is necessary to recognize that there are two main components 
to counterfeiting: manufacturing and distribution.65 
The manufacturing of counterfeits tends to arise in proximity to the 
manufacturing of genuine goods.66 In the early 1990s, one of the first areas 
open to foreign investment in China was in the southern region of Guangdong 
Province, near Hong Kong. MNCs opened manufacturing facilities in special 
                                                          
shepard/2018/03/29/meet-the-man-fighting-americas-trade-war-against-chinese-
counterfeits/#321a1941c0d6. 
 58 GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. 
 59 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU SEIZURES AT THE BORDER OF GOODS INFRINGING ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/ 
taxation/files/factsheet_ipr_report_2018_en.pdf. 
 60 See Shepard, supra note 57 (“The trade in counterfeit and pirated goods is currently at 
$1.7 trillion . . . and is expected to grow to $2.8 trillion and cost 5.4 million jobs by 2022.”). 
 61 See id. See also EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 59 (reporting that China and Hong 
Kong, together, accounted for over 83% of counterfeit goods). 
 62 OECD & EUROPEAN UNION INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT AND 
PIRATED GOODS: MAPPING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 49 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
9789264252653-en. 
 63 Memorandum on Combatting Trafficking in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, Section 1 
(Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-combating-
trafficking-counterfeit-pirated-goods/. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Daniel C.K. Chow, Organized Crime, Local Protectionism and the Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods in China, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 473, 474 (2003). 
 66 Id. 
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economic zones that created financial incentives for investment.67 Soon after 
these facilities were established, the brand owners found that counterfeits 
began to appear in the same locations.68 MNCs discovered that employees 
working in their facilities or their relatives, friends, or associates had begun 
to use the know-how that they acquired from the MNC to establish their own 
manufacturing operations in order to produce counterfeits.69  
A counterfeiter that has manufactured a fake good must then sell it to 
consumers. The illegal factory may be located far away from densely 
populated urban areas where large numbers of consumers are found, so the 
counterfeiter must find a distribution channel for the goods to reach the end-
use consumer. Distribution is the second major component of counterfeiting. 
Prior to the rise of the Internet, counterfeiters faced a problem: 
legitimate distributors would have nothing to do with counterfeits.70 MNCs 
distribute their products in China only through qualified distributors that are 
able to sell to high-end state-owned department stores and other retail outlets 
in high-end shopping centers.71 Qualified distributors are those entities that 
are able to pass a stringent set of criteria established by brand owners.72 These 
distributors will not work with counterfeiters for fear of losing their contracts 
with legitimate brand owners, and, as a result, counterfeiters are unable to 
penetrate into legitimate distribution channels to reach high-end retailers.73 
Rather, counterfeiters had to rely on brick-and-mortar wholesale distributors 
of lesser and questionable repute who would be willing to sell counterfeits, 
smuggled goods, and inferior quality products.74 These wholesale distributors 
are found in markets in China that are either enclosed or open air spaces with 
hundreds or thousands of wholesale vendors.75 Retailers appear at these 
wholesale markets with trucks or vans to transport the counterfeits purchased 
at these markets.76 Large reputable retailers, such as state-owned department 
stores, do not buy at these wholesale markets.77 Only retailers that are small 
mom and pop stores, street stalls, or open air vendors in China will purchase 
from these markets.78 This left the counterfeiter with the problem that it could 
                                                          
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. at 474–75. 
 69 This observation is based upon the author’s own experience working as in-house 
counsel for an MNC with major operations in China. It is a pattern that is repeatedly occurs in 
China: counterfeiting tends to arise in locations with legitimate manufacturing operations. 
 70 See Chow, supra note 65, at 476. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. at 476–77. 
 75 Id. at 476. 
 76 See Chow, supra note 65, at 476. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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almost never penetrate into high-end retail stores.79 Purchasers of 
counterfeits would have to travel to side streets, back alleys, and other areas 
in less desirable urban locations to buy counterfeits from small and less 
reputable retailers.80 The need to travel to unsavory locations deterred many 
consumers. 
In the United States, counterfeits are also unable to penetrate into 
legitimate distribution channels to reach large department stores or other 
large retailers.81 Counterfeits are almost never found in large chain stores 
such as Costco, Target, or Walmart. These companies either use qualified 
distributors or have vertically integrated business models that allow them to 
control distribution themselves.82 These distributors refuse to deal in 
counterfeits, smuggled goods, or gray market goods.83 Only less reputable 
distributors will deal in these secondary goods, but they do not sell to large 
and high end retailers who refuse to deal with them.84 These distributors sell 
to discount stores, small mom-and-pop stores, street vendors, or private 
persons who arrange for sales through word of mouth.85The advent of the 
Internet has now given counterfeiters what they have long sought: a 
legitimate and broad-reaching distribution channel to reach retail consumers 
who are now able to purchase products without having to travel to specific 
and undesirable locations where counterfeits are sold. Counterfeiters can now 
place their products on the Internet to reach consumers worldwide and are no 
longer confined to using illegal wholesale markets to reach lower retail 
quality stores. While in the past, consumers would not encounter counterfeits 
on the next shelf adjacent to authentic goods in brick and mortar stores 
because high end retailers refused to deal with distributors of counterfeit 
goods, the same is no longer true on the Internet. It is now possible for 
counterfeits to be on the digital shelf next to genuine goods on the same or 
an adjacent webpage.86 Counterfeits can now compete directly with genuine 
goods.87 Counterfeiters can also use false digital images that hide the low 
                                                          
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 This observation is based on the author’s own experience as an expert witness in U.S. 
litigation involving U.S. multinational companies in cases involving counterfeits from China. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Gray market goods (sometimes also called parallel imports) are genuine goods that are 
intended for sale in a foreign market but that are purchased abroad and shipped back to the 
home market. For example, genuine goods that are sold by the manufacturer to Japan are 
purchased by a foreign distributor in Japan who then resells them to an importer in China. The 
foreign distributor is able to take advantage of a lower price in Japan or favorable currency 
exchange rates in order to sell the products in China at a price that is lower than the genuine 
goods are sold directly by the manufacturer to buyers in China. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, 
supra note 55, at 567-68. 
 84 See Chow, supra note 65, at 476. 
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 86 See GAO REPORT, supra note 3, at 11. 
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quality of their goods in competition with genuine goods.88  
The rise of counterfeits coincides with shifts in consumer habits. In June 
2000, approximately 22% of U.S. consumers purchased goods online, but by 
December 2016 that portion had risen to 79%.89 By 2020, worldwide e-
commerce sales are expected to reach $4 trillion, and e-commerce is expected 
to reach nearly 15% of global retail spending by 2020.90 
Prior to the advent of the Internet, counterfeiters in China that sought to 
sell their goods in the United States loaded the goods in large shipping 
containers with false documentation to transport the goods by ocean carriage 
to a port in the United States.91 While detection was difficult, if a brand owner 
had reliable specific intelligence of an illegal shipment,92 customs authorities 
in the United States would open and inspect the container.93 With Internet 
sales, thousands or hundreds of thousands of small, individual packages are 
now shipped to the United States by mail, making it nearly impossible to 
detect and stop these shipments.94 
Not only do e-commerce platforms allow counterfeiters unprecedented 
access to end use consumers, counterfeiters are also able to take advantage 
of the anonymity of the internet to evade capture and detection by using false 
identities, business names, and locations.95 The Internet has created an 
irresistible new opportunity for counterfeiters and has opened vast new 
avenues for generating profit. 
C. Liability Regimes for Internet Service Providers 
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)96 in the United 
                                                          
location of sale to identify counterfeit goods in the marketplace, but counterfeiters have 
adopted new ways to deceive customers.”). 
 88 Id. Cf. id. (“The physical appearance of counterfeit goods may no longer serve as a ‘red 
flag’ for consumers that the good they are considering purchasing is not genuine. Counterfeit 
goods and their packaging are becoming more sophisticated and closely resemble genuine 
goods[.]”). 
 89 Id. at 12. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Chow, supra note 65, at 475. 
 92 Such intelligence can be gathered through the use of private investigation companies 
that penetrate counterfeit rings. A number of companies, such as Kroll and Pinkerton, 
specialized in these investigations. 
 93 The author was involved as an attorney in a counterfeiting case in the United States in 
which U.S. Customs authorities stated that they would be willing to conduct an inspection of 
shipping containers but only on the basis of reliable specific information. 
 94 See Pierson, supra note 13 (“Customs agents had a fighting chance when pirated goods 
predominantly arrived in cargo containers. But with the rise of e-commerce, counterfeiters and 
their middlemen can ship goods in parcels too innumerable to catch.”). 
 95 See id. (“[B]rands say the same fraudsters keep showing up under different names[.]”); 
Semuels, supra note 15 (“Milo and Gabby tried to track down the [counterfeit] sellers, but 
almost all of the sellers had given false names when setting up their Amazon seller accounts, 
and the addresses they gave turned out to be bogus as well[.]”). 
 96 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-68). DMCA implements two World 
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States and similar provisions in China,97 Internet service providers (ISPs) are 
not directly liable for the sale of counterfeits listed on their sites by third-
party vendors.98 While ISPs may be subject to vicarious liability for 
facilitating the sales, DCMA provides a “safe harbor.”99 ISPs are entitled to 
immunity from vicarious liability for third-party listings and sales of 
counterfeit goods if they have no knowledge of the infringing material and 
remove it expeditiously upon receiving notice of its illegal nature.100 To 
implement DCMA and the corresponding PRC law, e-commerce companies 
such as Alibaba and Amazon have set forth internal notice and takedown 
procedures that brand owners are required to follow when they find 
infringing material.101 As detailed in a later section, brand owners often 
complain that these procedures are cumbersome, time consuming, and 
ineffective.102 
D. Alibaba 
1. Brand Owner Concerns 
Alibaba is currently the world’s largest e-commerce platform in the 
world.103 In 2016, Alibaba’s Internet marketplaces in China had 423 million 
                                                          
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties: the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 112 Stat. 
2861, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 112 
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(last visited July 1, 2019). 
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MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 70 (2012). 
 100 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
 101 See Intellectual Property Policy for Sellers, AMAZON, https://sellercentral. 
amazon.com/gp/help/external/201361070 (last visited July 1, 2019); Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) Protection Policy, ALIBABA, https://rule.alibaba.com/ rule/detail/2049.htm (last 
visited July 1, 2019). 
 102 See infra Part III. 
 103 Comment Submitted by Eric Pelletier, Vice President of Alibaba, to the Honorable 
Probir Mehta, Assistant United States Trade Representative re: 2016 Special 301 Out-of-Cycle 
Review Notorious Markets (Docket Number USTR-2016-2013), at 2 (Oct. 7, 2016), 
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2016-Notorious-Markets-Report-2_FINAL_compressed.pdf?x95431 (last visited Nov. 25, 
Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet 
40:157 (2020) 
173 
active purchasers with a combined gross merchandise volume (GMV) of 
$485 billion.104 In 2018, in the span of just two years, active purchasers in 
China grew to 636 million and GMV grew to exceed $768 billion,105 creating 
the prospect that Alibaba’s users may soon surpass one billion and its GMV 
may soon surpass $1 trillion, numbers that seemed almost inconceivable just 
a decade ago. In 2015, package delivery from Alibaba’s e-commerce 
platform in China averaged thirty million per day.106 The sheer size and scope 
of Alibaba’s operations dwarfs even that of its closest competitors. For 
example, Alibaba’s GMV in 2018 at $768 billion is more than three times 
that of Amazon, the world’s second e-commerce platform, at $239 billion.107 
From Alibaba’s earliest days of operation, back in 1999, MNCs have 
claimed that counterfeits are abundantly available on Alibaba’s websites.108 
Frustrated with the lack of results in China, U.S. companies have raised these 
concerns with the U.S. government and, as a result, Alibaba has been 
repeatedly placed on U.S. government blacklists. Despite its many claims 
that it is implementing new changes to effectively combat counterfeiting on 
its websites, Alibaba was first placed on the Out-of-Cycle Notorious Markets 
List in 2011109 and sought to remove itself from the list in anticipation of its 
initial public offering (IPO) in the United States in 2014. Although Alibaba 
was dropped from the 2012 list,110 Alibaba found itself once again on the 
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 108 See, e.g., Alibaba and the 2,236 Thieves: An Online-Fraud Scandal in China, THE 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.economist.com/newsbook/2011/02/22/alibaba-and-
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 110 Doug Palmer, U.S. Drops China’s Taobao Website from “Notorious” List, REUTERS 
(Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-usa-trade-piracy/u-s-drops-chinas-
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Notorious Markets list in 2014111, 2016112, 2017113, and 2018114. Furthermore, 
in 2016, a group of 17 international trade associations reiterated their 
concerns in a letter to USTR, stating: 
During the ten months since USTR published [the 2015 USTR Special 
301 Notorious Markets Report] we have seen little evidence that there 
has been any noticeable change on the Alibaba platforms themselves; 
and at any given moment, a consumer around the world can chose 
from hundreds of thousands of counterfeit clothes, shoes, travel 
goods, handbags, toys, auto parts, jewelry, watches, furniture, 
electronics, pharmaceuticals, and other articles.115 
Many brand owners have concluded that Alibaba, despite its 
protestations to the contrary, actually tolerates and supports counterfeiting on 
its websites because Alibaba earns revenues from all sales, including sales of 
counterfeit goods. Labelling Alibaba as “our most dangerous and damaging 
adversary,”116 one brand owner stated: 
Alibaba’s strategy has consistently been to provide lip service to 
supporting brand enforcement efforts while doing as little as possible 
to impede the massive flow of counterfeit merchandise on its 
platforms.117 
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a. Alibaba’s Defense of Counterfeits 
Many brand owners’ skepticism about Alibaba’s sincerity in combatting 
counterfeiting can be attributed to statements made by its Chairman and 
founder, Jack Ma, that defend counterfeiting. In responding to criticism by 
luxury brands about the sale of counterfeits on Alibaba, Ma made clear his 
position in 2015. A commentator observed: 
The longer Ma talks, the more it’s clear where his sentiments fall. The 
second-richest man in China thinks the very idea of luxury retail—
selling belts and accessories and the like for thousands of dollars—is 
inherently absurd. “How can you sell Gucci or whatever branded bag 
for so much money? It is ridiculous,” he says. “I understand the 
branded companies are not happy, but I also say that’s your business 
model. You have to check your business model, too.”118 
The following year, in a speech at Alibaba’s headquarters, Ma stated: 
The problem is the fake products today are of better quality and better 
price than the real names. They are exactly the [same] factories, 
exactly the same raw materials but they do not use the names.119 
These statements suggest that Ma believes that there is a normative 
justification for Alibaba’s support of counterfeits. Ma believes luxury brands 
like Gucci are inviting unauthorized copies by charging prices so high that 
they are “absurd.” Alibaba sees itself as helping out small-time sellers that 
sell counterfeits or infringing products to lift themselves into the middle 
class. Jack Ma and Alibaba take on a modern “Robin Hood” persona. Just as 
the fictional Robin Hood robbed from the rich to give to the poor, Alibaba is 
assisting small-time Chinese sellers to take a free ride on the goodwill of 
luxury brands owned by MNCs that have invited counterfeiting through their 
greed, avarice, and attempts to gouge vulnerable Chinese consumers. China’s 
consumers also benefit from having access to fakes that are “of better quality 
and better price than thee real names.”120 Ma’s position may help Alibaba to 
further gain popularity in China by enhancing Ma’s reputation as a true 
national hero and great patriot of China, but it also infuriates brand owners.121 
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b. Counterfeits for Sale on Alibaba 
To test the claims of brand owners that counterfeits are found in 
abundance on Alibaba’s sites, the author recently did a search of Alibaba 
sites and immediately found many examples of counterfeits and infringing 
products. Photographs of the webpages containing three of these examples 
are set forth in the Appendices. These examples are discussed below, but 
there are other examples on this site that are too numerous to discuss within 
the confines of this Article. 
(a) Appendix 1 is an advertisement for handbags being sold under a 
“big brand name” (“Da Pai”) called “Gucci Guccio.” These handbags 
copy the design and trade dress of Gucci handbags and use the name 
“Gucci” as part of their brand name.122 Gucci was singled out by 
Alibaba Chairman Jack Ma as a luxury brand owner selling its 
products at absurdly high prices.123 The advertised price for these 
products is 1500 Renminbi (“people’s currency” or RMB, the Chinese 
fiat currency). At the currency exchange rate of 1 RMB to 0.15 U.S. 
dollar, this price is the equivalent of about $225 U.S. dollars. On 
Gucci’s website in the United States, genuine Gucci bags similar to 
the ones advertised on Alibaba sell for over $2000 U.S. dollars with 
some bags selling for as much as $7500.124 It is highly unlikely for a 
genuine Gucci handbag of the type in this advertisement to sell for 
$225. It is also highly unlikely that these types of prices can be 
charged for gray market goods.125 In addition, nothing in the 
advertisement indicates that these are second hand or used goods. 
Chinese consumers have an aversion to purchasing secondhand goods 
due to cultural reasons, and Chinese merchants are well aware of 
consumers’ dislike of secondhand goods.126 It is highly likely that the 
products advertised in the attached Alibaba webpage are counterfeits. 
(b) Appendix 2 is an advertisement for a 700 ml bottle of Hennessy 
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XO cognac with an advertised price of 432 RMB or $65. A similarly 
sized bottle (750 ml) sells for approximately $160 in the United 
States.127 It is highly likely that the bottle sold on the Alibaba website 
is a counterfeit. 
(c) Appendix 3 is an advertisement for fashion workout pants made 
by Abercrombie and Fitch, based in Columbus, Ohio, selling at a price 
of 80 RMB or $12. Based on the photograph and the author’s 
experience in tracking counterfeiters in the consumer products 
industry, it is apparent that these products are of low quality and are 
inferior to what Abercrombie and Fitch would sell in retail stores. By 
comparison, Appendix 4 includes a photograph of a similar 
Abercrombie and Fitch product from its website that sells for $58.128 
These facts indicate that it is highly likely that the product advertised 
on the Alibaba website is a counterfeit. 
To understand why brand owners view examples such as these as threats 
to their business, it is necessary to realize that in China (as in many other 
countries) there is a huge appetite for counterfeit goods, and many consumers 
actively search for and buy counterfeits.129 The vast majority of consumers 
in China who visit the webpages for the products described in the examples 
above are fully aware that these are counterfeit goods, but these consumers 
are actively seeking these goods.130 In the case of counterfeit Gucci handbags 
and counterfeits of other famous brand names, consumers are actively 
seeking to buy cheap imitations of the famous brand that they can purchase 
for a tenth or less than the genuine product.131 These consumers want the 
prestige of the brand, trademark, or trade dress and are not concerned about 
the quality of the actual merchandise itself.132 So long as the product has the 
trademark or trade dress, the purchaser of the counterfeit is able to enjoy the 
                                                          
 127 Hennessy Cognac XO, WINE CHATEAU, https://www.winechateau.com/products/ 
hennessy-cognac-xo (last visited July 1, 2019). 
 128 See Appendix 4 infra. 
 129 Jay Kennedy, Commentary: More Buying Counterfeits and Knockoff - It’s Costing 
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market for fake goods in China is largely driven by consumers who actively search for and 
purchase counterfeit products”). 
 130 This observation is based on the author’s own experience in China. See Liz Robbins, 
Investigators Seize Fake Luxury Goods, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/16/nyregion/fake-luxury-goods-handbags.html.  
 131 This observation is based on the author’s work with private investigation companies 
tracking counterfeiters in China. 
 132 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 784 (3d ed. 2017) (consumers will knowingly purchase 
fake luxury goods). 
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good will associated with the brand name or trademark.133 In China today (as 
in many other countries), there is an enormous demand for counterfeit luxury 
branded handbags that offer the prestige of the genuine brand at a fraction of 
the price of the genuine product.134 
The same is true with counterfeit liquor as shown in example (b) above. 
Consumers in China who purchase counterfeit bottles of famous brand name 
liquor are not in general buying the liquor for private or personal 
consumption.135 In China, for personal or professional reasons, people often 
have banquets or dinners where highly alcoholic drinks are served and 
consumed in large quantities as part of social drinking rituals.136 It is a mark 
of prestige for a host to serve a famous foreign brand of liquor, such as a 
French made cognac like Hennessy or a western brand of whiskey such as 
Johnny Walker Black Label.137 There is a huge demand for this type of 
counterfeit liquor, where the counterfeiter uses a bottle that is either a copy 
or a genuine used bottle and fills it with a cheap but potent liquor.138 The host 
can enjoy the good will of serving his guests a high prestige brand while only 
paying for a common liquor that, while inexpensive, is just as potent but is 
not contaminated or harmful to the guests. 
In the case of (c), young adults in China are highly fashion-conscious 
and are hungry for famous international brands.139 Most consumers viewing 
the webpage with Abercrombie and Fitch pants selling for $12 are fully 
aware that these are counterfeits and that the product is of low quality. They 
reason, however, that they can pay about the same price for a low-quality 
product without the prestige of the counterfeit Abercrombie label or pay a 
little bit more for the same low-quality product but enjoy the prestige of the 
Abercrombie brand name. Many consumers will choose the latter.140 
                                                          
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 These observations about the use of alcohol in China are based upon the author’s own 
experience and based on discussions with colleagues and associates. 
 136 See Nathan H. Gray, “Gan Bei”: Business and Ritualistic Drinking in China, WORD 
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 137 See Jiani Ma, Rich Post-80s Drive Chinese Whiskey Market Growth, JING DAILY (Apr. 
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FASHION LAW (Aug. 7, 2018), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/luxury-brands-tailor-
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2. Alibaba’s “Arrogance” and Illegal Activities 
While MNCs have consistently complained about Alibaba’s tacit 
approval and support of counterfeiting, these sentiments were recently 
confirmed for the first time by enforcement authorities in China in connection 
with an extraordinary national level investigation of Alibaba. The State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and its local branches 
(AICs) are charged with maintaining orderly markets in the PRC and are 
primarily responsible for stemming the flow of counterfeit goods.141 In the 
case of Alibaba, the SAIC took the unprecedented step of conducting an 
administrative guidance meeting with Alibaba officials in July 2014.142 The 
Director of the SAIC emphasized the unique nature of the meeting when he 
stated, “For this meeting, I didn’t know whether it’s the first ever of its kind, 
or the last, but I hope that this would be the last time for a meeting of this 
nature.”143 
Enforcement actions are usually the provenance of local AICs as the 
SAIC, the central level authority, is a supervisory and policy-making body.144 
However, the SAIC believed that in the case of Alibaba, it was necessary for 
the agency to step in to resolve a case that had proven to be intractable to 
local authorities.145 In the administrative guidance meeting, the SAIC and 
appropriate local level AICs met with Alibaba officials in order to set forth 
an agreed upon set of steps to remediate counterfeiting on Alibaba 
platforms.146 
The administrative guidance meeting between the SAIC and Alibaba 
executives occurred on July 16, 2014,147 and on January 28, 2015, the SAIC 
issued a White Paper as a follow up to the meeting to formally set forth a 
                                                          
 141 State Administration of Industry and Commerce, IP CHANNEL (Feb. 9, 2010), 
http://ip.people.com.cn/ GB/152255/10960401.html. 
 142 See Transcript of Administrative Guidance Meeting Between SAIC and Alibaba (held 
July 14, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Transcript of Admin. Guidance Meeting]; 
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 145 See SAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 31, at 11–12. 
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 147 See id.; Huang, supra note 31. 
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plan of remediation.148 In both the transcript of the meeting and in the SAIC 
White Paper, the SAIC makes the point repeatedly that at the time of the 
meeting in July 2014 there were numerous counterfeits, infringing products, 
and other violations of Chinese laws on advertising, product information, and 
licensing on Alibaba’s websites.149 
However, the point being made by the SAIC White Paper and during 
the administrative guidance meeting is more subtle, and even more deep-
seated, than the need to control persistent illegal activities. For example, the 
SAIC states: 
Alibaba Group, for a long time, has failed to take seriously the 
operational violations on its e-commerce platforms and did not take 
effective measures to address the violations. This caused a miniscule 
issue to snowball into a serious problem, leading Alibaba to its 
greatest crisis since its incorporation.150 
This critique is not directed at practices involving IP rights; it is directed 
at an underlying culture at Alibaba, which is one of viewing itself as above 
the law, including an attitude of a willful refusal to obey the law. At another 
point, the SAIC White Paper states: 
It is suspected that [Alibaba] knowingly, intentionally, by negligence 
or in spite of their presumed knowledge facilitates unlicensed 
operations, trademark infringements, untruthful publicity, pyramid 
schemes and violations of consumers’ rights.151 
The SAIC traces Alibaba’s flouting of the law to an attitude of 
“arrogance.”152 An AIC official at the July 16, 2014 meeting stated that when 
speaking to Alibaba employees, he felt “a kind of arrogant emotion sprouting 
and growing.”153 In its White Paper, the SAIC specifically tells Alibaba that 
it should “redress arrogance.”154 The SAIC informs Alibaba that it cannot 
expect to “receive special treatment under law. . . . Regulators . . . shall treat 
businesses equally under law.”155 The SAIC also admonishes Alibaba to 
“ethically conduct business” and warns that “[a]n enterprise shall not get 
                                                          
 148 See SAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 31. The purpose of the White Paper is to provide 
“various understandings and information about the said administrative guidance meeting” to 
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what it wants at its own will.”156 The SAIC additionally warns Alibaba that 
it cannot flout the law when it finds the law interferes with its interests and 
then assert the law when it needs the law’s protection despite acting without 
credibility or integrity.157 
Although the SAIC stood in the position of a government regulator at 
the meeting, it at times seemed to descend into the role of a sycophant 
flattering the Alibaba executives for the purpose of cajoling and pleading 
with them to respect the law. For example, at the administrative guidance 
meeting, AIC officials lavishly praised Alibaba, telling the executives how 
proud the PRC was of their accomplishment,158 mentioning that all of the 
Alibaba executives at the meeting were “famous people”159and “big 
shots,”160 and joking that the monthly salary of just one of the Alibaba 
executives were as much as the combined annual salaries of all the AIC 
officials present at the meeting.161 
a. Specific Practices 
Alibaba’s lack of respect for the law manifested in two practices that 
drew the SAIC’s special attention and were the focus of discussion during 
the administrative guidance meeting: taking bribery from the platform 
participants and colluding with the counterfeiters. The SAIC states that “a 
large number of Alibaba staffers take business bribes in exchange for giving 
platform participants [preferential business opportunities] to squeeze out 
their competitors.”162 While Alibaba was already aware of the bribery 
problem and took some steps to control it, the AICs stated that bribery was 
still a problem as of the July 16, 2014 administrative guidance meeting,163 
and an Alibaba vice president at the meeting acknowledged that “temptation 
from the outside” is a problem among the Alibaba staff.164 The SAIC also 
cited Alibaba employees’ active participation in misleading consumers and 
committing various consumer protection violations. For example, the SAIC 
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 157 “An enterprise shall not get what it wants at its own will, i.e. when needing credibility 
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notes that “[s]ome of the online shops, through the trading with others, delete 
negative comments, providing business information to themselves and others 
that disrupts normal business order . . . . But [Alibaba’s] supervision and 
punishment are not strict enough. There are staff in [Alibaba] involved in this 
violation.”165 A second set of practices involves Alibaba employees working 
together with counterfeiters, tipping the counterfeiters off to enforcement 
actions. For example, an SAIC official stated that in one instance the SAIC 
asked Alibaba for information about ten online stores suspected of selling 
counterfeits; although Alibaba provided the information, seven of the stores 
promptly closed, two cancelled their accounts, and one started to sell 
authentic products.166 The SAIC concluded that “[t]his indicated information 
disclosure by your company staff”167 to the counterfeiters. In another 
instance, the SAIC stated that after local AICs provided Taobao, an e-
commerce platform owned by Alibaba, with information about their 
investigations, Taobao was suspected of tipping off counterfeiters and 
manufacturers of illegal narcotics.168 
The unlawful activities by Alibaba employees discussed at the 
administrative guidance meeting in July 2014 came just three years after a 
major scandal in 2011 that involved about 100 Alibaba employees, including 
supervisors and sales managers, who after an internal investigation were 
found to be directly responsible for allowing over 2,300 China Gold 
Suppliers to defraud international buyers.169 Long time CEO David Wei Zhe 
and COO Elvis Lee Shi Huei were forced to resign as a result of the 
scandal.170 According to news reports, Alibaba lost $933 million in market 
share due to the scandal.171 Three years after this scandal, according to the 
SAIC, numerous members of Alibaba’s staff continued to conduct illegal 
activities adding further to its perception of a culture of lawlessness at 
Alibaba. 
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b. Above the Law in China 
Alibaba’s “arrogance” needs to be understood in the context of China’s 
legal and political culture. In China today, it is not unusual for powerful 
entities to routinely disregard the law. In general, the more powerful an 
entity, the less compelled it feels to follow the law. Alibaba is among a 
handful of the most powerful entities in China. As a mundane example 
familiar to every citizen in China, cars registered to the People’s Liberation 
Army (“PLA”) do not obey traffic laws.172 Every car registered to the PLA 
has a special license plate. These cars will routinely drive through red lights, 
speed, and refuse to pay tolls. Under China’s current security systems, cars 
that drive through red lights are recorded by cameras stationed at every traffic 
stop, and letters containing fines are sent to transgressors. PLA cars, 
however, do not pay fines. No regular police officer with the Public Security 
Bureau will dare to stop a PLA car for a traffic violation, and no toll collector 
will dare to challenge a PLA car that refuses to pay the toll. This is a deeply 
embedded cultural attitude that starts at the top with the most powerful entity 
of all in Chinese society: the Communist Party, which views itself as above 
the law and views the law as a mere instrument for it to use to achieve its 
own ends.173 These Party attitudes will be familiar to Jack Ma, the chairman 
of Alibaba, who is also a member of the Communist Party,174 as are other 
senior Alibaba executives.175 
As noted earlier, Alibaba’s size is prodigious, and its financial power 
overwhelming.176 In China today, an entity that is as large and powerful as 
Alibaba does not believe that it needs to answer to lowly government 
enforcement officials. Alibaba executives, such as Chairman Jack Ma, 
himself a Communist Party member, and other senior Alibaba officials who 
are also Party members, believe that they do not answer to the law but only 
to the Party, the ultimate authority in China.177 One example of the close link 
between Alibaba and the Party is that Alibaba runs China’s new social credit 
system.178 Alibaba assigns a three digit score (from 350 to 950) to each 
citizen in China based on the social desirability of the citizen’s conduct, 
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allowing the government to punish or reward its citizens.179 These close ties 
further suggest that Alibaba is not intimidated by and does not fear PRC 
enforcement authorities. For their part, PRC enforcement authorities are 
reluctant to shut down or seriously harm Alibaba because such actions will 
lead to significant financial losses for China and the possible demise of one 
of the world’s leading technology companies and a great source of national 
pride.180 
An indication of how Alibaba continues to view itself as above the law 
in China is that on April 25, 2019, the USTR placed Alibaba on its Notorious 
Markets List for the third year in a row.181 This designation occurred five 
years after the SAIC administrative guidance meeting in July 2014 and four 
years after the SAIC issued the White Paper detailing a plan of remediation 
in 2015. In its 2018 report, the USTR stated, “[a]lthough Alibaba has taken 
some steps to curb the offer and sale of infringing products, right holders . . 
. continue to report high volumes of infringing products and problems with 
using takedown procedures.”182 After a history of misconduct, scandals, 
vehement protests by brand owners, an extraordinary effort by the PRC 
government, and numerous blacklists by the U.S. government, Alibaba’s 
conduct has not changed appreciably. Under these circumstances, brand 
owners must confront the reality that Alibaba is not likely to change its 
conduct without intervention by the highest levels of the Party, probably only 
by a personal decision by Xi Jinping, China’s President and the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party.183 Until senior Party leaders intervene, 
brand owners must accept the likelihood that Alibaba believes that it can 
operate outside of the law in China with impunity and without fear of 
government reprisals. 
E. Amazon 
Amazon is currently the largest e-commerce marketplace in the United 
States184 and is the second largest in the world, trailing only Alibaba.185 As 
of 2016, the market value of Amazon exceeded that of the eight largest U.S. 
brick-and-mortar retailers combined, including Walmart, Target, and Best 
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Buy.186 In December 2018, Amazon’s GMV reached $239 billion.187 One of 
its most popular online retail services, Amazon Prime, now has over 100 
million members worldwide.188 Amazon’s official anti-counterfeiting policy 
states that it is the responsibility of the seller or supplier to ensure that its 
products are genuine, not counterfeits.189 Two aspects of Amazon’s business 
practices have led to a rise in online counterfeits. 
Once a brand owner agrees to sell its products on Amazon’s e-
commerce marketplace, Amazon will source products not only from the 
brand owner, but also from other third-party vendors that sell the branded 
products. In order to have sufficient inventory on hand to satisfy customer 
orders expeditiously, Amazon’s warehouses will co-mingle products from 
the brand owner and from other third-party vendors into a single source of 
supply.190 If a third-party vendor ships a counterfeit product to Amazon, it 
becomes co-mingled with genuine products in Amazon’s warehouse. When 
a customer orders a product online, the customer may receive a product from 
the warehouse from either the brand owner or a third-party vendor, which 
might be a counterfeit. The source of the product is not clear to the customer 
when he or she makes a purchase, but the customer will generally assume 
that it was manufactured by the brand owner. 
Unable to make inroads into China’s e-commerce marketplace against 
competitors such as Alibaba, Amazon decided in 2015 to woo Chinese 
manufacturers to sell directly to U.S. consumers on its e-commerce site.191 
As China is the world’s largest source of counterfeits, the result was 
predictable: beginning in 2015, counterfeits soon began to proliferate on 
Amazon’s e-commerce sites, much to the chagrin and exasperation of brand 
owners. Brand owners’ complaints against Amazon also echo some of the 
complaints against Alibaba. For example, according to one brand owner 
representative, “Amazon is making money hand over fist from counterfeiters, 
and they’ve done about as little as possible for as long as possible to address 
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III. ENTITY VERIFICATION MEASURES AND THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF PRC LAW 
The discussion in Part II centers on how the concern is different in each 
case, although brand owners voice similar concerns about counterfeits 
available on Alibaba and Amazon. The major complaint by brand owners 
with Alibaba is that it facilitates the sale of counterfeits in order to satiate the 
enormous appetite for counterfeits among China’s consumers. In the case of 
Amazon, the major concern of brand owners is that U.S. consumers who seek 
to purchase genuine products are instead deceived into purchasing a 
counterfeit. In both cases, brand owners have expressed frustration with the 
lack of effective enforcement by these e-commerce platforms against 
webpages or postings selling counterfeits on Alibaba or Amazon’s websites. 
These problems are further discussed below. 
A. Problems with Enforcement  
Although brand owners have many complaints about enforcement 
issues against counterfeiters on Alibaba and Amazon platforms, the crux of 
these complaints can be summarized as follows: (1) counterfeiters use false 
identities and addresses and thus are untraceable; (2) brand owners must 
suffer through the use of cumbersome and ineffective notice and takedown 
procedures; and (3) existing measures used by e-commerce platforms do not 
deter repeat infringing activity. 
1. False Names, Identities, and Addresses 
Current e-commerce platforms, including Alibaba and Amazon, do not 
subject new sellers to adequate verification or confirmation although Alibaba 
is required to do so under PRC law; without an enforced verification or 
confirmation process, counterfeiters routinely use false or inaccurate names 
and addresses when registering with these e-commerce platforms.193 When 
brand owners pursue counterfeiters in enforcement actions, they discover that 
names and addresses are fictional, and the counterfeiters then disappear into 
the vast expanse of cyberspace. Brand owners argue that Alibaba and 
Amazon have few requirements for registration and that verification of this 
information is not thorough or adequate. In the case of Alibaba, the SAIC 
White Paper stated that “only lip service is paid to credential review and 
registration of vendors.”194 Brand owners often complain that vendors on 
Amazon use fictitious names and addresses.195 
2. Burdensome Notice and Takedown Procedures 
E-commerce platforms create bureaucratic or technical hurdles in 
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helping brand owners to locate or identify sources of counterfeits and 
counterfeiters.196 These hurdles delay, frustrate, and create additional 
financial burdens for brand owners.197 Both Amazon and Alibaba use a notice 
and takedown procedure that is based upon requirements set forth in the 
DMCA198 and similar provisions in PRC law, respectively.199 When a brand 
owner discovers an offending webpage or posting, the brand owner is 
required to submit notices to the ISP under a certain set of criteria that results 
in the ISP requiring the removal of an offending webpage or posting. Brand 
owners have described the experience of using notice and takedown 
procedures as “Kafka-esque”200 and likened their use to being imprisoned in 
“Amazon purgatory.”201 Brand owners are required to place an order for the 
counterfeit goods, buy and receive the goods from the offending website, test 
the goods, verify that they are counterfeit, and then submit both the 
counterfeit and genuine product with notices documenting these actions.202 
Alibaba has a “three strikes” policy,203 requiring proof of three completed 
transactions involving counterfeits and submission of notices before an 
offending webpage can be removed. This process can take months, is 
expensive, and consumes significant time and effort by the brand owner. 
Even when brand owners satisfy this arduous process, they complain that the 
notices are still often ultimately rejected for technical reasons.204 
3. Lack of Deterrence 
In those instances in which brand owners can achieve a takedown of the 
offending website or otherwise bring pressure to bear on counterfeiters, 
brand owners complain that once the counterfeit goods disappear, they 
reappear in short order on a new webpage.205 Some brand owners refer to this 
process as a futile game of “Whac-A-Mole” in which a counterfeiter 
disappears only to immediately reemerge under a new name, identity, and 
location to resume its counterfeiting operations.206 In the meanwhile, brand 
owners have expended significant time, effort, and money in pursuing the 
                                                          
 196 See supra text accompanying note 15; see also supra text accompanying note 101. 
 197 See Bercovici, supra note 15. 
 198 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-68). See also Intellectual 
Property Policy for Sellers, supra note 101 (Amazon); Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Protection Policy, supra note 101 (Alibaba). 
 199 See generally Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97; Law 
Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97. 
 200 Bercovici, supra note 15. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Enforcement Actions for Intellectual Property Rights Infringements Claims on 
Alibaba.com, ALIBABA (Nov. 1, 2017), https://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2043.htm. 
 204 See Bercovici, supra note 15. 
 205 See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 206 Bercovici, supra note 15. 
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counterfeiting without achieving any tangible results. 
B. Proposed Remedial Measures 
While counterfeiting on the Internet is a daunting problem, China 
provides the information technology tools that can be used to deter 
counterfeiters and that can address each of the three major enforcement issues 
faced by brand owners: false identities and addresses, convoluted notice and 
takedown procedures, and rampant recidivism. Most brand owners are 
completely unaware of or otherwise do not understand these potent tools. 
1. AIC Business License 
As part of China’s extensive system of industrial and social control, a 
legal regime of identification and attribution of legal liability exists that can 
be used against counterfeiters involved in e-commerce commerce. Both in 
the July 16, 2014 administrative guidance meeting and in its White Paper, 
the SAIC repeatedly refers to Alibaba’s need to control counterfeiting at the 
point of entry (i.e., registration on the Alibaba websites). The AICs stressed 
that if entry is well controlled, many of Alibaba’s current problems can be 
solved.207 This Article argues that brand owners should heed the advice of 
China’s enforcement authorities and seek to have e-commerce platforms 
implement effective registration procedures in accordance with the specific 
requirements of PRC law. These measures can create prophylactic measures 
at the point of entry that can create an effective deterrent to counterfeiting.  
Article 23 of SAIC Order No. 60, Measures on the Administration of 
Online Transactions (“MAOT”)208 requires business operators of online 
platforms to verify the legal identities of all entities or persons applying for 
access to their platform for the sale of products: 
The business operator of a third-party transaction platform shall 
examine and register as business operators the identities of the legal 
persons, other economic organizations or industrial and commercial 
sole proprietors that apply for access to the said platform for sale of 
products or provision of services, establish registration files and 
conduct regular verification and updating, and make public the 
information specified in their business licenses or provide electronic 
links to their business licenses in eye-catching locations on its main 
web pages for business activities.209 
As set forth above, Article 23 requires the e-commerce platform to 
display information in the business licenses of business operators or to 
                                                          
 207 Hua Yu of Fujian Provincial AIC: “Until now, it seems that there are some difficulties 
in solving some problems. But in fact, if the entity is well controlled, I don’t think it will be a 
problem.” Transcript of Admin. Guidance Meeting, supra note 141, at 27. 
 208 See Administrative Measures for Online Trading, supra note 48. 
 209 Id. at art. 23 (emphasis added). 
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provide a link to their business licenses.210 Under PRC law, every lawful 
business entity in the PRC must have a business license issued by the local 
AICs that contains the lawful business scope of the entity, its address, and 
the name of its legal representative.211 All lawful enterprises must have an 
official, AIC-issued business license; any entity that does not have a business 
license cannot lawfully operate.212Business operators obtain a business 
license by applying to local AICs that review their proposed business 
operations to ascertain that they are lawful and economically feasible.213 For 
example, if a business operator proposes to sell trademarked products, the 
AICs will ask for proof of a trademark registration or trademark licensing 
agreement.214 The issuance of a business license means that the AICs have 
reviewed and approved the proposed business plan of the applicant and found 
it to be lawful.  
Among its other functions, the business license sets forth the lawful 
business scope of the entity. For example, a business license might state that 
the entity is lawfully authorized to engage in the sale of laundry detergent or 
other cleansing agents for laundry. Such an entity would be acting unlawfully 
if it engaged in any business outside of that scope, such as, for example, the 
sale of peripheral equipment for computers or mobile phones. A business 
operator that obtains a business license for the sale of genuine products but 
instead sells counterfeits is in violation of its license and faces a fine or 
suspension of the license, which would require ceasing business operations.  
The business license also prevents the business operator from using a 
business name and address on an e-commerce site different from that on the 
business license. Only the business identified in the license by its name and 
address is lawfully entitled to use the business license, i.e. such licenses are 
not transferable and cannot be used by an entity other than the one that 
                                                          
 210 Id. 
 211 Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. I, art. 7 (promulgated by the 
President of the PRC, Order No. 42, Oct. 27, 2005, effective on Jan. 1, 2006) (“The business 
license for a company shall state therein such matters as the name, domicile, registered capital, 
actual paid-up capital, business scope, the name of the legal representative, etc.”) [hereinafter 
Companies Law of the PRC]. 
 212 See id. (“Company registration authorities shall issue business licenses for companies 
established under the law. The date of issuance of a business license for a company shall be 
the date of establishment of the company.”). See National Enterprise Credit Information 
Publicity System, SAIC, http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/index.html (last visited July 1, 2019). See 
also The 5-in-1 China Business License (WFOE/WOFE), FDI CHINA (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.fdichina.com/blog/china-company-registration/wfoe-wofe/5-in-1-business-
license/. 
 213 This observation is based upon the author’s own experience in applying for business 
licenses in China. See Matt Slater, What Is a China AIC?, CHINA CHECKUP (Dec. 9, 2013), 
https://www.chinacheckup.com/blogs/articles/china-aic (“China AICs . . . provide official 
registration records for all companies in their jurisdiction[.]”). 
 214 The author has applied for business licenses in China and was asked by the AIC to 
provide proof of ownership or authorized use of trademark rights for products sold under the 
mark to ensure that the business had the legal right to sell the branded products. 
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applied for and received the business license. A business operator that has 
sold counterfeit goods and that has been the subject of an enforcement action 
cannot just simply disappear and reappear on the Internet under a different 
business name and address; if the name and address do not match that on the 
license, the use of the license is unlawful. Strictly verifying the information 
on the business license will prevent business operators accused of 
counterfeiting from disappearing and immediately reappearing under a 
different name and address. To use a different name and address, the business 
operator would have to apply for a new business license from the AIC, a 
process that could take months.215 
Requiring a valid business license will preclude many underground 
counterfeiting factories, petty criminal organizations, smugglers, and other 
illegal entities from registering to sell on an e-commerce platform because 
such entities are unwilling to undergo scrutiny by the AICs for fear that their 
illegal activities will be exposed, leading to prosecution by AICs and other 
PRC authorities, such as the Public Security Bureau (the police). These types 
of nefarious entities and persons are also involved in brick-and-mortar 
counterfeiting; they operate illegal underground factories and have no 
business licenses.216 However, without a valid business license, these entities 
will be unable to register on an e-commerce platform such as Alibaba in 
accordance with Article 23 of the MAOT. 
2. Legal Representative 
The business license will also contain the name of the business entity’s 
legal representative.217 Under PRC law, every lawful business must have a 
natural person who serves as the legal representative of the business entity.218 
According to PRC law, the legal representative has the clear authority to act 
on behalf of the business entity and can bind the business entity to contracts 
and other legal relationships.219 In many cases, the chairman of the board of 
directors of a company or a person of a similar rank in other organizations 
will serve as the legal representative.220 PRC authorities wanted to make sure 
that under the law, it was always clear which person within a business 
enterprise could sign a legally binding contract or create other legal 
                                                          
 215 This observation is based on the author’s own personal experience in applying for 
business licenses in China. 
 216 The author’s own experience is that many of these counterfeiters do not operate their 
businesses within the boundaries of the laws and regulations. 
 217 Companies Law of the PRC, supra note 211, at ch. I, art. 7 
 218 General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 51, at ch. III, art. 38 (“In 
accordance with the law or the articles of association of the legal person, the responsible 
person who acts on behalf of the legal person in exercising its functions and powers shall be 
its legal representative.”). 
 219 Id. 
 220 Any person can serve as a legal representative, but companies usually appoint a high 
ranking official. 
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relationships.221 Although not specifically required by the MAOT, e-
commerce platforms should require the business entity’s legal representative 
to undergo the registration procedures so as to make certain that the business 
entity has lawfully committed to legal obligations created by registration.  
Under PRC law, the legal representative is also personally subject to 
administrative and criminal liability whenever the company conducts illegal 
operations beyond the range approved by registration authorities, commits 
fraud, secretly withdraws or transfers funds, or engages in other illegal 
activities.222 The existence of the legal representative ensures the PRC 
government that there is always a flesh and blood person who will be 
responsible to PRC authorities for violations of the law by legal “persons,” 
such as a business enterprise. 223 PRC authorities did not want ultimate civil 
or criminal liability to rest solely with a legal fiction while natural persons 
escaped responsibility.224 
By identifying a business entity’s legal representative through requiring 
submission of its business license, e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba 
would provide the brand owner with a flesh and blood person against whom 
it can directly bring a complaint in a civil lawsuit under the PRC Trademark 
Law225 or Anti-Unfair Competition Law226 or whom the Public Security 
Bureau (the police) can arrest under the PRC Criminal Law.227  
With these requirements, brand owners would not be limited to using 
the e-commerce platform owner’s internal enforcement mechanism, such as 
                                                          
 221 General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 51, at ch. III, art. 38. 
 222 General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 49: 
Under any of the following circumstances, an enterprise as legal person shall bear liability, its 
legal representative may additionally be given administrative sanctions and fined and, if the 
offence constitutes a crime, criminal responsibility shall be investigated in accordance with 
the law: 
(1) conducting illegal operations beyond the range approved and registered by the 
registration authority; 
(2) concealing facts from the registration and tax authorities and practicing fraud; 
(3) secretly withdrawing funds or hiding property to evade repayment of debts; 
(4) disposing of property without authorization after the enterprise is dissolved, disbanded 
or declared bankrupt; 
(5) failing to apply for registration and make a public announcement promptly when the 
enterprise undergoes a change or terminates, thus causing interested persons to suffer 
heavy losses; 
(6) engaging in other activities prohibited by law, damaging the interests of the State or 
the public interest. 
General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 51, at ch. II, art. 49. 
 223 General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 51, at ch. III, arts. 38 & 49. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97. 
 226 Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97. 
 227 Selling counterfeits violates Article 140 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic 
of China. See Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, ch. III, art. 140 (promulgated 
by the President of the PRC, Order No. 83, Mar. 14, 1997). 
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the notice and takedown procedures. As PRC law requires that the business 
operator make its business license available on the e-commerce platform and 
as business licenses are publicly available on the AIC websites, the brand 
owner does not need to go through the platform owner to obtain the necessary 
information to directly pursue the business operator.228 Instead, the brand 
owner can immediately act against the legal representative listed in the 
business license upon discovering an offending webpage or posting rather 
than be subject to the long and frustrating delays of the notice and takedown 
procedures. Of course, the brand owner can also use the platform owner’s 
internal procedures in addition to bringing an action directly against the 
business operator through PRC enforcement authorities or, under some 
circumstances, in the United States if the offender has sufficient U.S. 
contacts.229 
The use of an enforcement method that does not rely on the active 
participation of the e-commerce platform is particularly useful in the case of 
Alibaba, which the PRC authorities themselves have identified as viewing 
itself above the law. Any method of enforcement against counterfeiters that 
requires the active participation of Alibaba could be met with half-hearted 
efforts or resistance, as many brand owners have persistently suspected and 
complained. Directly pursuing the counterfeiter will also relieve brand 
owners from the burden of using Amazon’s convoluted internal procedures. 
3. Verification and Deterrence 
Requiring, verifying, and displaying seller information should create an 
effective deterrent against selling counterfeits on Alibaba and other e-
commerce platforms, since fewer counterfeit sellers would even turn to the 
platform in the first place if such sufficient safeguards were in place. 
Counterfeiters always rely on the use of false identities, false names, and 
false addresses because they are fearful of detection, capture, arrest, and 
prosecution.230 This is true of counterfeiters who sell in brick-and-mortar 
outlets as well as counterfeiters who sell on the Internet. The essential tools 
                                                          
 228 A similar procedure can be used in the case of sole proprietorships that would require 
individuals to register, i.e. Alibaba should do a strict review of the identity card of the 
registrant. “A natural person who intends to engage in online product transactions shall carry 
out business activities via a third-party transaction platform, and submit to the third-party 
transaction platform his/her name, address, valid identity proof, valid contact details and other 
real identity information.” General Principles of the Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 51, at 
ch. I, art. 7. The same principle applies: identifying the name and address of a flesh and blood 
person who can be held civilly and criminally responsible can be an effective deterrent against 
counterfeits on Alibaba websites. 
 229 It would be possible to file an action against a Chinese counterfeiter in the United States 
only if the counterfeiter is subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the 
minimum contacts standard set forth in Int’l Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and its 
progeny. 
 230 This observation is based on the author’s own extensive experience in pursuing 
counterfeiters in China and in the United States. 
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of the counterfeiter are secrecy, subterfuge, and artifice. The counterfeiter 
relies on these tools to disappear at the first sign of trouble. Denying the 
counterfeiter the use of these tools of secrecy and disguise would force the 
counterfeiter to operate openly and transparently subject to legal actions in 
China or in the United States, a prospect that counterfeiters abhor. Many 
counterfeiters would find the price of transparency and the risks of capture 
too high a price to pay for operating on the Internet and, as a result, will be 
deterred from registering on e-commerce platforms.  
Currently, however, as the SAIC notes, Alibaba “only pays lip 
service”231 to verifying information. The SAIC specifically criticized Alibaba 
for numerous careless and lax practices in its examination of business 
licenses that fail to verify that the entity named in the business license was 
the user of the license.232 A review of the Alibaba webpages contained in the 
Appendix indicates the business operator has not displayed or provided 
access to its business license on its webpage as required by Article 23 of the 
MAOT.233 At present, many individuals register on Alibaba’s websites by 
using false identification papers, sets of which—as the SAIC noted—can be 
purchased on Alibaba’s websites.234 Under its guidelines, Amazon does not 
require online sellers from China to submit an AIC business license or 
identify a legal representative. Currently, Amazon only requires a business 
name, a telephone number, and some form of personal identification, and, as 
a result, many vendors provide fictitious information.235 
4. Amazon and PRC Law 
Although Alibaba is clearly subject to the SAIC Measures on the 
Administration of Online Transactions, it is arguable that Amazon is also 
subject to these provisions as applied to business entities in China that 
register on Amazon. Under traditional choice of law principles, the physical 
location of the business entities in China provides a basis for choosing 
Chinese law to govern the matter of the registration of those entities.236 Even 
                                                          
 231 SAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 31, at 13. 
 232 “Some online stores that are required to upload business licenses to pass the true name 
authentication have an entity name, business address, residential information that apparently 
are not consistent with the entity name, business address or residential address on the business 
license. Some vendors uploaded business license information of other companies.” Id. 
 233 See Appendices 1-3. 
 234 Transcript of Admin. Guidance Meeting, supra note 142, at 98. 
 235 Selling on Amazon: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 44 (requiring a business 
name, address, and contact information among other information in order to open an Amazon 
seller account); see also supra note 13 (brand owners find vendors provide bogus 
information). 
 236 Under the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 188(2), the following factors 
would support a finding of PRC law to govern the registration requirements: (a) place of 
contracting, (c) place of performance, (d) location of the subject matter of the contract, and 
(e) place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts of Law § 188(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1971). 
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if choice of law rules do not dictate the application of the SAIC Measures, 
nothing prevents Amazon from choosing on its own, through a choice of law 
clause in its contracts with vendors, to follow PRC law and require each 
Chinese business to submit an AIC business license or a link to the license 
on its websites as well as requiring the legal representative to undergo 
registration procedures.237 This process will allow brand owners in the United 
States to bring an action directly against business operators in China that use 
offending webpages or posts on Amazon in lieu of or in addition to pursing 
notice and takedown procedures. As the vast majority of counterfeits 
originate from China,238 such measures could be an effective deterrent to 
counterfeits on Amazon. 
5. Consent to Arbitration before CIETAC 
Although not required by MAOT or other PRC law, e-commerce sites 
should also include in their registration procedures a clause requiring the 
resolution of disputes involving foreign elements by arbitration before the 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC).239 CIETAC has its headquarters in Beijing and facilities in other 
cities in China and Hong Kong;240 it lists many foreign experts among its 
roster of arbitrators,241 and parties can choose English as the language of the 
arbitration.242 The clause should include a provision that the business 
operator consents to the arbitration of disputes with the platform owner or an 
entity authorized by the platform owner, i.e., the brand owner. 
Arbitration clauses providing for resolution of disputes by CIETAC are 
now commonly used by many companies to resolve international business 
disputes that involve China,243 and arbitration is generally the normal method 
for resolving international disputes.244 The advantage of such a clause for the 
brand owner is the certainty that an action can be filed against the legal 
                                                          
 237 Parties can also choose the applicable law through a choice of law provision. See id. § 
187. 
 238 See supra Part II.A. 
 239 China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arbitration Comm’n (CIETAC) Arbitration Rules, art. 3(2) 
(revised and adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and China 
Chamber of International Commerce on Nov. 4, 2014 and effective on Jan. 1, 2015), 
http://www.cietac.org/Uploads/201904/5caae5be03bb5.pdf [hereinafter CIETAC Arbitration 
Rules]. 
 240 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 239, art. 2(3). 
 241 Arbitrators, CIETAC, http://www.cietac.org/index.php?g=User&m=Arbitrator&a= 
index&l=en (last visited July 1, 2019). 
 242 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 239, art. 30. 
 243 See Model Clause: China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), INT’L TRADE CENTR., http://www.intracen.org/Model-Clause-China-International-
Economic-and-Trade-Arbitration-Commission-CIETAC/ (last visited July 1, 2019) 
(promoting the use of a model arbitration clause using the CIETAC). 
 244 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 55, at 593 (noting that arbitration is now the normal 
way to resolve international business disputes). 
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representative of the business operator with CIETAC and that CIETAC will 
have jurisdiction over the respondent. This will allow brand owners to move 
expeditiously when filing an action with CIETAC without having to deal 
with the uncertainty of preliminary issues such as proper notice and 
jurisdiction in a court-based litigation. The brand owner will also not need to 
suffer through the agony of waiting months required by using notice and 
takedown procedures.  
CIETAC awards enjoy a high degree of respect and enforceability in 
China. PRC law requires parties to implement CIETAC arbitral awards245 
and the awards are enforceable by Chinese courts at the local level.246 
Consent to arbitration before a prestigious entity such as CIETAC would act 
as a further powerful deterrent to counterfeiters in China, who are used to 
dodging legal authorities not consenting to appear before them. The threat of 
being brought before CIETAC should further deter counterfeiters from 
registering on e-commerce platforms. For those merchants that do register, 
brand owners will have a quick and effective method of enforcement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The dawn of the age of e-commerce in the new millennium opened new 
possibilities for legitimate commerce, but it also created vast new 
opportunities for illegal commerce, such as the sales of counterfeits on a 
previously impossible scale and level of penetration. This Article has detailed 
some of the daunting challenges the Internet created for brand owners and 
the brand owners’ numerous but frustrated efforts in dealing with this potent 
new threat.  
This study has focused on the two largest e-commerce sites in the world 
that dominate online retail services in China and the United States and the 
lessons learned can be immediately applied to other sites. The kinds of 
problems that brand owners face on Alibaba and Amazon are both different 
and similar.  
The problems are different in that Alibaba facilitates the sale of 
counterfeits to satiate the enormous demand for counterfeits by Chinese 
consumers, whereas Amazon sells counterfeits on its e-commerce site to U.S. 
consumers who are deceived into buying a counterfeit when they sought to 
buy a genuine product. Together, Alibaba and Amazon can deliver a 
crippling one-two punch to brand owners: Alibaba facilitates the sale of 
counterfeits of their products to those consumers who seek them, and 
Amazon facilitates the sale of counterfeits to those who do not. Considering 
                                                          
 245 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 239, art. 55(1) (“The parties shall perform the 
arbitral award within the time period specified in the award. If no time period is specified in 
the award, the parties shall perform the award immediately.”) 
 246 CIETAC Arbitration Rules, supra note 239, art. 55(2) (“Where one party fails to 
perform the award, the other party may apply to a competent court for enforcement of the 
award in accordance with the law.”) 
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that there are other huge e-commerce sites such as JD.com and Tencent in 
China and e-Bay and Groupon in the United States with similar issues, brand 
owners are faced with numerous dangerous threats.  
The problems are similar in that brand owners find the pursuit of 
counterfeiters through these two e-commerce giants to be frustrating and 
ineffective and the direct pursuit of counterfeiters to be futile, as 
counterfeiters quickly vanish into cyberspace at the first sign of trouble.  
Both sets of problems can be remediated through the suggested course 
of action set forth in this Article. However, while brand owners have made 
many demands to Alibaba and Amazon to streamline and improve their 
internal procedures for the monitoring of counterfeits and their notice and 
takedown procedures, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no brand owner 
has looked closely at PRC law for help despite the urging of PRC officials.247 
Given the poor reputation of China in protecting foreign intellectual property 
rights,248 this lack of trust in PRC law is understandable, but information 
technology tools are available that can be put to effective use. Of course, 
these tools were not created by the PRC with the goal of protecting foreign 
brand owners, but instead for the purpose of satisfying China’s obsessive 
need to closely monitor all aspects of Chinese civil society. While China is 
far behind the United States in protecting intellectual property rights, China 
is far ahead of most countries in using information technology to monitor and 
supervise all aspects of Chinese civil society.249 These tools can provide a 
level of effective deterrence to Chinese counterfeiters that seek to sell their 
illegal wares on internet commerce sites based in China or the United States. 
Brand owners can use the tools detailed in this Article on their own, or in 
conjunction with existing and developing new tools through internet 
commerce sites as an overall strategy of deterrence.  
To be able to use the tools discussed in this Article, brand owners only 
need to insist on what they have every right to receive: e-commerce sites in 
China, such as Alibaba, must faithfully obey relevant provisions of PRC law 
that are simple and straightforward, an area in which Alibaba falls far 
short;250 and e-commerce sites in the United States, including Amazon, 
should apply PRC law on entity registration of Chinese business operators 
                                                          
 247 See supra note 206. 
 248 See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms and the World 
Trade Organization, U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 8 (forthcoming 2019) (file on copy with the author). 
 249 One example is China’s recent social credit system, which involves assigning a social 
credit score indicating the desirability of a citizen’s conduct to each citizen in China, a country 
of over 1.38 billion people. See supra note 42. There is also a more menacing side to China’s 
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Xinjiang Province. See China’s Hi-Tech Police State in Fractious Xinjiang a Boon for 
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 250 See supra Part II.D.2. 
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under traditional choice of law rules, a choice of law clause, or voluntarily. 
Verification of entity registration should become easier with the enactment 
of proposed new data security legislation that would impose civil and 
criminal liability for the misuse of electronic information.251 Entities that 
register on e-commerce sites could become liable for the use of false, 
misleading, or inaccurate business licenses and thus would have an additional 
legal incentive to use business licenses accurately. 252  
Alibaba poses a particularly formidable challenge to brand owners due 
to its overwhelming size and power within China and its leading role in 
facilitating the online sale of counterfeits. Alibaba’s prodigious wealth and 
strength has led, in the words of PRC officials, to a culture of “arrogance.”253 
Brand owners have suspected for years that Alibaba tacitly tolerates and 
supports counterfeiting in order to earn revenue from these sales. Recently, 
PRC national government authorities have confirmed these suspicions as the 
result of an extraordinary national-level intervention intended to discipline 
Alibaba. Beyond tolerating and supporting counterfeiting, Alibaba, in the 
words of PRC national authorities, views itself as above the law and unafraid 
of and not intimidated by PRC enforcement authorities.254 In fact, the 
opposite seems to be the case, as the 2014 investigation of Alibaba by the 
SAIC indicates: government authorities are reluctant to seriously discipline 
Alibaba or its business due to Alibaba’s exalted stature and reputation as a 
national paragon in China.255 This raises a deeper issue with Alibaba for 
brand owners, as this attitude is unlikely to change without intervention by 
the highest levels of the Communist Party, a topic that deserves further 
scholarly exploration but is beyond the scope of this Article.  
The proposed course of action described in this Article has the 
advantage of not having to rely on Alibaba’s active participation; all that is 
required is that Alibaba mechanically apply the law as is required for 
registration of online vendors, and brand owners can on their own enforce 
their rights against offending parties in civil and criminal actions in China or 
the United States. The proposals set forth in this Article also apply to 
problems that brand owners face on Amazon and other U.S.-based e-
commerce sites, so long as these sites apply PRC law as a result of choice of 
law analysis, a choice of law clause, or voluntarily. So long as Amazon 
follows PRC law in entity registration verification, brand owners can proceed 
directly with legal actions against counterfeiters and infringers in China or 
                                                          
 251 Shuju Anquan Guanli Banfa (Zhengjiu Yijian Gao) Di Si Tiao (数据安全管理办法
（征求意见稿）第四条), translated in Security Measures for Data Security Management 
(Draft for Comments), art. 4, COVINGTON UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION, https://www.inside 
privacy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2019/05/Measures-for-Data-Security-
Management_Bilingual-1.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2019). 
 252 Id. 
 253 See supra text accompanying note 151. 
 254 See supra text accompanying notes 151-156. 
 255 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
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the United States and are not relegated to the misery of relying solely on 
Amazon’s convoluted and cumbersome internal procedures.  
Ironically, while most brand owners have focused their attention on 
streamlining the internal monitoring procedures of e-commerce platforms, 
they have ignored the more effective tools that are available in plain sight in 
China’s legal system. By using these tools created by China’s obsessive need 
to closely monitor and control all aspects of its civil society, brand owners 
can help to deter counterfeiters by forcing them to shed their concealment 
and anonymity and by exposing them to what they fear and loathe the most: 
transparency and accountability for their illegal actions. 
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Appendix 2. Alibaba Listing: Hennessy XO 
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